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their members quamembers, yet each is very useful in organizing
established knowledge and continuing inquiry in their respective
domains. And the same holds for “concept.” For example, the
neo-empiricist, friendly to Machery’s general take on our concep-
tual systems, might want to defend the substantive claim that
perceptual symbols are a kind of concept. Such a claim would be
substantive, to the effect that the delineated class contains some
additional sorts of entities. Indeed, Machery himself wonders
whether there are other kinds of concepts (p. 249). For example,
he writes, “Evidence shows that people have some knowledge
about ideals. What is now needed is to determine whether these
bodies of knowledge qualify as concepts” (p. 249). This strikes us
as a meaningful and important question, and one for which the
term “concept” is obviously useful in asking.
So, independent of the question of hybrids, psychologists should
keep the term. Even if Machery is right, and concepts are not a
natural kind, the potential dangers herewould be better addressed
through reformation instead of elimination. The practical advice to
take away from Machery’s arguments may be, not that scientists
should get rid of “concept,” but that they should be more careful
in understanding that this term likely fails to pick out a very tidy
sort of natural kind. Doing so should allow them to steer around
the sorts of dangers that Machery (2009) hypothesizes about
(e.g., pp. 242–243), without sinking an otherwise fruitful vehicle
of inquiry. The psychology of categorization, inference, and so
on may be much messier than philosophers and psychologists
have hoped. But “concept” is still likely to be a vitally important
word for theorizing about that mess.
Concept talk cannot be avoided
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Abstract: Distinct systems for representing concepts as prototypes,
exemplars, and theories are closely integrated in the mind, and the
notion of concept is required as a framework for exploring this
integration. Eliminating the term “concept” from our theories will
hinder rather than promote scientiﬁc progress.
While most people interested in concepts will ﬁnd much to agree
with in this book (Doingwithout Concepts, Machery 2009), it is the
eliminativist thesis that will ﬁnd most resistance. Machery provides
analogical cases in psychology such as “emotion” and “memory.”
Emotion andmemory, it is argued, may prove to be terms referring
to a varied set of phenomena, without any identiﬁable single associ-
ated brain system. Similar cases can be found in other sciences –
for example, “species” and “planet.” The concept of species is pro-
blematic because there is not always a clear criterion for differen-
tiating one species from another; instead biological laws describe
the distribution of genes over populations of individuals (Mayr
1982). While problems of deﬁnition mean that “species” is not a
well-deﬁned term in biology, it would, however, be hard to
imagine biological discourse without it. There are just too many
general truths that need to be expressed. Similarly, astronomers
ran into trouble with the designation of Pluto as a planet, given
the discovery of other large orbiting bodies that had been
labeled as asteroids. But the term still has a referential meaning.
Science needs more loosely deﬁned general referring expressions
in addition to the carefully deﬁned terms that ﬁgure in theories.
I argue that cognitive science still needs the notion of “concept,”
even if it proves multifaceted and hard to deﬁne satisfactorily.
Machery’s argument rests on there being three distinct forms
of knowledge that are recruited by default by cognitive processes:
namely, prototypes (P), exemplars (E), and theories (T). The
danger of eliminating the notion of concept is that the impor-
tance of the relations between these forms of knowledge risks
being underplayed. First, there is the obvious point that the P,
E, and T representations (let’s call them PET) of dog all refer
to the same class – they are broadly co-referential (give or take
some differences in categorization resulting from exceptional
contexts). What makes them co-referential is the fact that they
represent the same concept. Without a notion of concept, it is
hard to explain why they co-refer.
More importantly, the term “concept” is needed as part of an
account of the many situations in which the PET systems inter-
act. How does one discuss concept combination, including the
formation of composite prototypes, the importing of exemplar
knowledge, and the coherence checking of the result through
background theory, if one cannot have the integrative term
“concept” to specify just what it is that is being combined. The
combination occurs at the concept level, and the description of
the processes involved then requires elaboration in terms of
the PET systems. Similarly, in concept learning, we need an over-
arching notion of concept in order to describe how PET systems
interact. Experiential concepts like DOG or CUP may ﬁrst be
learned by a child through interacting with individuals encoun-
tered in everyday life. When a variety of individuals are known,
and it is necessary to learn to use the words “dog” and “cup” cor-
rectly, then prototypes may be formed, enabling generalization
to other individuals, discrimination of other classes, and the
accumulation of generic knowledge. As the child then develops
wider knowledge, the prototype notion of DOG may be sup-
plemented by theoretically driven concepts like mammal or
species, and by essentialist ideas about the causal properties of
biological kinds, or the need to defer to expert opinion about
correct classiﬁcation.
Far from aiding scientiﬁc advance, treating the PET systems as
largely independent of each other may impede investigation of the
important ways in which information is transferred between
them. It can also be argued that the three systems are not as
easily distinguished as Machery would require. Consider proto-
types and exemplars. Machery agrees that much of the research
and debate concerning prototypes and exemplars has been
directed at a very restricted form of behavior, namely, learning
to classify simple geometrical shapes in a laboratory setting
where the categories to be learned are not easily distinguished
without extensive training. Even in this arcane area of psychology,
there is considerable evidence that under different conditions
people will either learn individual exemplars or will abstract pro-
totypes (Smith & Minda 1998). If we move to the more “concep-
tual” domain of natural language terms, then the question of
prototype versus exemplar models hardly arises. For example,
Storms et al. (2000) have investigated whether typicality in super-
ordinate categories like FISH, FRUIT, or FURNITURE is best
predicted by similarity to the category prototype or by similarity
to “exemplars.” But in this case the exemplars are simply proto-
types deﬁned at a more speciﬁc level (e.g., CHAIR and
TABLE). So the question is not which of two distinct systems is
driving the behavior, but rather which level of abstraction is
involved within a single representational system. Some concepts
do have genuine exemplars – the concept of “Beethoven Symph-
ony” to a musician will be heavily dependent on knowledge of the
nine exemplars. But there will be a close link between knowledge
of the exemplars and generalized knowledge about the typical
structure and expressive vocabulary found in the works.
Likewise, there has been a rapprochement between prototype
and theory-based elements of concepts. In discussing the notion
of prototype (Hampton 1998), I have proposed that the dis-
tinguishing feature of prototype representations is that they rep-
resent the center of a class and not its boundary. It is this fact that
gives rise to category vagueness, typicality gradients, the lack of
explicit deﬁnitions, and the preponderance of generic (rather
than necessary) features in people’s accounts of the content of
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the concept. The notion of prototype as a form of schema is there-
fore free to be supplemented by causal connections within the
representation resulting in a structured frame representation
(Barsalou & Hale 1993). Mutability and centrality of properties,
modal judgments of necessity, and dissociations between simi-
larity-based typicality and theory-based categorization can all be
accommodated within this single representational system.
In short, it is too soon to be counseling despair about integrat-
ing prototype, exemplar, and theory-based representations into a
coherent account of the concept of concept.
Eliminating the “concept” concept
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Abstract: Machery suggests that the concept of “concept” is too
heterogeneous to serve as a “natural kind” for scientiﬁc explanation, so
cognitive science should do without concepts. I second the suggestion
and propose substituting, in place of concepts, inborn and acquired
sensorimotor category-detectors and category-names combined into
propositions that deﬁne and describe further categories.
Whatever a “concept” is, we have at least one for every thing we
can recognize, act on, name, or describe, including not only the
things denoted by all the dictionary words we understand, but
also everything we know what to do with (Harnad 2007), even
if we don’t know its name or it has none – perhaps because,
like “things that are bigger than a breadbox,” no one has ever
bothered to name it.
“Things” can be individual objects (nonliving or living), kinds,
events, actions, properties, or states. We have “concepts” of
countless such things, and having the concept simply means
being able to do something with respect to those things, an
action that has a right and wrong about it – anything from
approaching/avoiding the thing, to interacting with or manipulat-
ing it in some way, identifying it (correctly) by name, saying true
things about it, imagining it, and thinking and reasoning about it.
In Doing without Concepts, Machery (2009) suggests that
although there is no “natural kind” corresponding to the intersec-
tion of prototypes, examples, theories, and sensorimotor rep-
resentations, each may still turn out to be a legitimate natural
kind of its own. I will sketch an alternative that scraps both the
use and the mention of “concept” altogether.
Consider concept’s twin, “percept.” If a concept is, roughly,
an “idea,” then a “percept” is an “image.” Should we ban talk
of percepts, too? Pylyshyn (1973) suggested banning talk of
“images” – as unobservable, unmeasurable, homuncular, and,
most important, nonexplanatory – to be replaced by propositions,
and, eventually, computations, which are genuinely explanatory,
in that they can generate the capacity that the images or “percepts”
had been meant to explain (Harnad 2006).
With ﬁndings on mental rotation (Shepard & Cooper 1982),
however, “percept” has made a comeback, in the form of internal
analog structures and processes that have some of the properties
of images but can do the internal generative work, with no
homunculus, sometimes more efﬁciently than computation.
(Digital computation can always approximate analog dynamics
as closely as we like: A picture is always worth more than 1,000
words, but 10,000 words come closer. It cannot, however, be
words all the way down; Harnad 1990.)
Apart from their sensory shapes, objects have sensorimotor
“affordances”: things that objects are amenable to having done
with them (by our bodies, and their shapes). A chair (but not a
pyramid or a pincushion) affords sittability-upon; a doornail,
but not a doormat, affords grasping and turning. But is an affor-
dance-detector a “representation”?
We need to be able to recognize birds, for example, before we
can start doing anything with them, including talking and think-
ing about them. No machine vision program could perform any-
where near human level using prototype-matching to recognize
birds; raw example-storage would do even worse. And without
those, verbal theories could not even get off the ground
(because it can’t be words all the way down).
So what we need ﬁrst is not bird representations, but bird-
detectors. For most of us, visuomotor contact is our ﬁrst introduc-
tion to birds, but it is not “we” who pick up the affordances; we
are no more aware of the tuning of our internal category detec-
tors than subjects in mental-rotation experiments are aware of
rotating their inner images. Internal mechanisms do this “neo-
empirical” work for us (Barsalou 1999; Glenberg & Robertson
2000). The work of cognitive science is to discover those mechan-
isms. That done, it no longer matters whether we call them con-
cepts, ideas, notions, representations, beliefs, or meanings.
Cognitive science has not yet done this job, though Turing
(1950) set the agenda long ago: Scale up to a model capable of
doing everything we can do (Harnad 2008). The ﬁrst hurdle is
sensorimotor category detection: the mechanism for learning cat-
egories from sensorimotor interactions with the world, guided by
error-correcting feedback. We share this capability with most
other species: learning to detect and act upon sensorimotor affor-
dances. To categorize is to do the right thing with the right kind of
thing (Harnad 2005).
Some categories are innate: We recognize and know what to do
with them because natural selection already did the “learning” by
genetically pretuning our ancestors’ brains. But most categories
we have to learn within our lifetimes, including everything
named and described in our dictionaries plus many things,
actions, events, properties, and states we never bother to name:
We learn to do the right thing with them, and perhaps describe
them, on the ﬂy. How did we get those names and descriptions?
Our species is the only one that has them.
According to our account so far, we only have the categories for
which we have learned through direct experience what to do with
their members. One of the most adaptive things our species alone
does with many of our categories is to name them. For, with
language evolved our capacity to produce and understand strings
of category names that encode truth-valued propositions, predicat-
ing something about something. This allowed us to acquire new
categories not only by sensorimotor induction, but also by verbal
instruction. For once we have a set of categories “grounded”
directly in our sensorimotor capacity to detect their members
and nonmembers, we can also assign each category an agreed,
arbitrary name (Harnad 1990), and then we can deﬁne and
describe new categories, conveying them to those who do not
yet have them, by combining and recombining the names of our
already grounded categories (Cangelosi & Harnad 2001) in prop-
ositions. Then and only then does the “theory-theory” come in, for
verbal deﬁnitions and descriptions are higher-order category-
detectors, too, as long as all their component terms are grounded
(Blondin-Masse´ et al. 2008). Here we are right to call them “rep-
resentations,” for they are descriptions of categories, and can be
given to and received from others without every individual’s
having to learn the categories directly from experience – as long
as the category-names used in those descriptions are ultimately
grounded in direct sensorimotor categories.
There is much ongoing research on the mechanisms of sensor-
imotor category learning in computers, neural nets, robots, and the
brain, as well as on the origins and mechanisms of natural language
processing. It is nowhere near Turing-scale, but this sketch
rearranges the cognitive landscape a bit, to preview how we can,
as Machery suggests, do “without concepts”: What takes their
place is innate andmostly learned sensorimotor category-detectors
(for which the learning mechanisms are still not known, but
Commentary/Machery: Pre´cis of Doing without Concepts
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2010) 33:2/3 213
